1955 report what was Messina (birthing EU) for? 1945 report what was british language world service fo?; 2022-1945 what was UN & ITU for; dad. The economist's norman macrae, spent his last days as teen navigating air planes bomber command burma; he tried his best at reparation ever since- wind assisted, so to speak, by the most valuable question media men were ever given - von neumann 1951 asked dad: to ask anyone/everyone what goods will peoples do with 100 times more uniting tech every decade to 2020s? In 1951, VN had 6 years left working on good (ie way above zero sum human development exchages) after the Goats of maths (including einstein turing ..) had spent moist of their life on the bad on nuclear arms racing. They had a reason to defeat hitler. I am no genius (just a listener who ,oves transparent maps/maths) ---but can anyone tell me why are we currently using nuclear races to defaeal all 8 billion of our beings. MUCH MORE IMPORTANT FROM 9/9/2022: if you have time to add positive thinking to our survey QueenofHearts.city - please do

Wednesday, November 17, 2021

Extract from Economist Norman Macrae 1971 survey of UK and EU

 Norman was the only journalist at EU's birth Messina; in 1976 he partnered with a young Romano Prodi to survey Entrepreneurial Revolution - why sustainability depended increasingly on health of sme (small-medium enterprise) networks not big corporation and big bureaucratics

Here are more of Norman's surveys on how much more humanity could do with von neumann machines (norman was this tech wizard's biographer) - our forthcoming book on noeman's greatest end poverty hero has this trailer  )- chris.macrae@yahoo.co.uk

From enemy she became lover




New Munich stands outside old

Munich, itself destroyed by allied

bombs but now rebuilt. Lost in this

new Munich’s glass and concrete cor-

ridors stands a modest row of semi-

detached houses, whose improbable

name is Torquato lasso Strasse. Who-

ever named that street must have been

a European romantic wanting to dress

up the common market's rather drab

prosperity. Perhaps he was thinking of

Tasso’s heroine in the “ Liberata,”

Armida, who advanced with hatred

in her soul on the sleeping Rinaldo, but

then without explanation or warning :  

From enemy she became lover. At

the root of the dccidely unroinantic

commercial construction of the com-

mon market lie two such sudden

reconciliations, After the war the

Oernan Armida embraced France.

Now, even more suddenly, neo-gaullist

France has embraced the not exactly’

slumbering Rinaldo of Bexley.



The fight inside Britain over whether

to “ join Europe ” has been and still is

bitter but little thought has been

given so far to what will happen if the

pro-Europeans win, or indeed to what is

already happening in a much

changed Europe. I'he purpose of this

survey is to remedy that. Both the

present and the probable futures seem

far from what most pro-Europeans

originally expected. In “I'he Phoenix

is short-sighted ” (The Economist,

May 16, 1970) Norman Macrae des-

cribed the argument to which vc have

all now become inured :


The greatest debate in British histoiy at

present seems to be conducted mainly

between inaccurate pedants and unspcci-

tic romantics. The pedants argue against

a decision that will affect our descen-

dants for centuries by composing wholly

erroneous micro-economic equations

based on the 1969 off-farm price of

butter. The romantics try 10 waft us

into a huge but little-discussed con-

stitutional change »n trailing clouds of

purple guff.


The time for micro-economic equa-

tions and ]mrple gulT has since been

left behind. Changing the dollar's

value a fortnight ago against every

European currency willy-nilly

thrust Europe's nations closer together.

Today British entry begins to seem a

minor event. That paradox has been

put in an exaggerated way by Mrs

Miriam Cainjis :


Within the span* of a few weeks this

past summer Mr Nixon announeed that

i* would shortly be visiting the

People’s Republic of China, . . . two

astronauts rode around on the surface of

the moon in a contraption looking not

unlike that used by the less athletic

breed of golfer, and the United Stales

blew a gaping hole in the Bretton Woods

structure that has served as the frame-

work f(jr the economic relationships

among most of the non -communist parts

of the world for the past 25 years. The

three events having, apparently, nothing

to do with Europe have, in all prob-

ability, a good deal more to do w'ith the

shape ot Europe in the decade ahead

than has our event [British entry]

ostensibly designed to make a major

impact on the character of the Euro-

pean construction.


This survey does not indulge much

in geopolitics, It concerns itself only

with Europe and only with the next

few \ears — ^with the immediate after-

math). *n other words, of the belated

completion of British entry, and of the

.equally belated watershed in postwar

history crossed by President Nixon last

August 15th and December 20th.


The first of these, the 'impact

of British entry, could splinter Europe

furtther or be the making of it. The

second. Mr Nixon's home truths last

Augu.st, opens up the question of how

easy Europe will find life with fewer

and less ceriain economic and military

guarantees coming to it from America.

The tempiation field out bv both

events is for Europe to return to its

old divided wavs, trusting to luck that

the past 27 years of peace and plenty

have somehow been ordained by a

nuclear god to last for ever.


Agenda for change


This survey will look at the changes in

the nature of commerce whicch

British entry into ine common market

will confirm. It will also look at how

Europe will use the econoimc influence

which its wealth give n. in an econo-

mic world whose big members begin to

resemble competitive carbon copies of

one another with little room left for

trading give and take. Britain brings

a financial way of looking at business

that could make London into Europe’s

New York, and Europe consequently

into a more real economic entity than

Brussels alone could create.


Then the uncertain future of

Europe's relations with the super-

powers, notably with America and

therefore with the Soviet Union, will

have to he considered. This in turn

raises the problem of Europe’s security

and defence.


All these together suggest that

Europe will function at all only if the

chemistry of its politics and self-

interest is enough to bind together

tho.e nationalistic atoms of Germany,

France and Britain which have spent

centuries flying apart. The success of

this triangular relationship will prob-

ably decide all.


It will not be achieved in Brussels,

whose place as an autonomous centre

of power is open to doubt. So, before

plunging in, let us first dispel this and

other common market myths.



What the EEC is not



Perhaps all of us most of the time have

been misled by the common market’s

own inner contradictions. Its first myth

is to call itself Europe, when it is in

reality a self-centred customs union,

plus a self-centred farm policy, put

together by increasingly self-centred

individual governments. Its joint insti-

tutions are peopled by romantics who

are older than they were when the EEC

was born in 1958, and whose idealism

grows old with them. Most confusing

of all, the common market exists, is

indeed the only remotely likely pan-

European structure in existence, and

yet what makes it attractive to late-

comers like the British is the fact that

it barely does exist at all. The Euro-

pean Economic Community (to give it

its founding name which Brussels,

typically, has now changed to the more

grandiose, less accurate “ European

Community”) is an infant creature,

barely formed. The point of elementary

schools, says Paul Goodman, the

American education!^, is to undo

the damage done at home, so the child

can begin to breathe again and be

curious.” With Britain joining, both

the Six and Britain are about to leave

home and go to school to mature



British entry, the consequences of

the Nixon package, the Franco-

Cjerman argument have combined to

make a busily ineffectual shambles of

the common market at the very

moment when everyone had expected

that the EEC would be allowed to go

into a sort of collective chrysalis,

inside which might be generated the

European butterfly everyone has been

waiting for. Instead, that chrysalis is

being smashed open before the meta-

morphosis of the creature inside has

had time to take place. The sight of

big countries squabbling is entertaining

for journalists and anti-marketeers, but

for very few other people. The second

myth among Europeans is their half-

boast, half-complaint that Europe sinks

these difrerence.s best when faced by

outside threats. Hungary, Suez, fear of

American military withdrawal, sheer

distrust of lohn Foster Dulles's con-

tacts with Khrushchev over Berlin, are

.said to have helped to get the Treaty

of Rome off the ground by 195,8.

Likewise the invasion of Czechoslovakia

in 1968 is supposed to have helped

persuade de Gaulle that the time was

come to talk to Britain again. Or so

the argument runs.


Nearer the truth is that the Treaty

of Rome got off the ground as the



truncated commercial relic of a much

grander dream — a political and defence

community — and then more by virtue

of Franco-^German accord than because

of the existence of an outside threat.


Even this latest year of achievement,

1971, owes little to outside threats. The

Six’s agreement on an experimental

try at monetary union was reached last

February in a time of relative monetary

calm. And when it was confronted by

a threat from outside it immediately

fell apart. It was settled in the first

place by a Franco-German deal. And

it fell apart when France’s and

Germany’s interests fell apart. Equally,

British entry was in the end not

achieve because of the pressure of an

outside threat. It was achieved more

by the internal arguments (some of

them strictly commercial and vote-

catching) which were at work in France

after de Gaulle, and it was achieved

more particularly by the revived

French neurosis about the gathering

political strength of Germany.


“ You ask what the common market

is to us ? ” said the man from Siemens.

“ It is very little more than a machine

for making words.” It is a harsher

judgment than the men in Brussels

deserve. But it exposes a third myth,

the confederal and even federal dreams

of “ voung men ” now in their forties

and fifties who grew up on the gradual-

ist approach to a European ideal put

forward by Jean Monnet, Rolxirt

Schuman and Paul-Henri Spaak. The

tale in Brussels is now no longer, as

Mato, EEC, WEU,

Scaliger would have wi^ed, “dealing

with the praises of brave men.”


The dreams of the 1950s are gone

partly because the 1950s are gone.

They were, as Mr Callaghan said this

October to the Labour party in

Brighton, admirable ideas in their

time. As usual when he is power-

broking, Mr Callaghan made half the

point. Ilie other half is that as the

result of those dreams the EEC now

exists in a somewhat different form

from the old hopes people had for

it. The day is receding when Europe’s

soverei^ nations will allow ithe E^’s

institutions to become sovereign instru-

ments for a federal power.


A rule for newcomers


What is and will be confusing for the

newcomer is that the EE£, precisely

because it is such a slight creation thus

far, will be described to him in quite

different terms by different people. As

a bright young Frenchman in a place

of considerable common market power

answered when asked whether, in die

middle of a Franco-German bust-up,

the common maiket could any longw

be said to exist : “ So lon^ u we all

keep talking about it, it exists.” Those

hoping to fathmn die common market

should start with a single rule : never

take on board what diey hear or read

from Brussels imtil the idea has been

thoroughly checked out in the national

oqiitals. It almost always turns out to

be different in Paris, Bonn, Rome and

Ha^, which is s^ere the deci-

sions and the deals are made.



Not another America


A final myth is to imagine that Euro-

pean unity will owe much to the

pattern set a century before by the

United States of America. That Ameri-

can pattern, so fine at the fume, is an

illusory one to copy today. America is

having to cope wi^ the fact that free

and capitalist continents, even when

they speak a single language (which

Europe does not), are not easily run by

a single rentral government. The one

telling point which the British Conser-

vative party’s pet anti-marketeer. Sir

Derek Walker-Smith, has made all year

was when he taunted the majority

lined up against him at the party con-

ference with the remark : “ Super-

power does not seem to bring

super-happiness, does it ? ”



Europe has the resources to become

an actual superpower but its people

are increasingly unwilling to allow &is

to happen. Why ? Rightly or wrongly

Europe’s people do not fear invasion

from outside. Rightly or wrongly they

lose btde deep over ^e notion of being

won to communism by Moscow-

financed subversion. Rightly or

wrongly west Europeans, though they

may cordially detest many of one

another’s policies, no longer expect to

go to war with one ano&er.


Lastly, what made America one were

the frontier tensions and racial legacy

which led a northern, and later a cen-

tral, federal power, at a certain point in

American history, rightly to impose its

will on socially r^ressivc, disorganised

and hopelessly under-financed local

“ states.” A social need for one western

Europe does not now exist. If that

need did exist some people doubt if

the establishment of a European

government would be the way to satisfy

it, for it would be further removed

from the plain citizen than are the

already over-complex national govern-

ments in Europe today. Today’s mood

is very much against more bigness and

centralisation. The myth of the

dreamers is to think a single entity

is being built. What is being built is

a base of common interest which may

one day be an entire construction of

harmony. According to the Oxford dic-

tionary, harmony is a “ combination of

musical notes,” not, as harmonisers in

Brussels often seem to prefer, a angle

boring sound.


The place to start building a base is

at the bottom ->50 let us turn first to

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